We describe mechanisms in a simple model in which villagers (rural households) receive remittances from migrants over two periods. The first period is the lean season and the second is a "normal" season with greater resources. We derive predictions on the effect of a drop in the cost of sending remittances for consumption, borrowing, remittances, and hours of work. A similar question about the price elasticity of remittances is asked in the literature on international remittances (Yang 2011), although here we interpret "the drop in price" broadly as access to a qualitatively different (more convenient, secure, and flexible) mode of sending money. Please see Appendix Appendix G for proofs.
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Setup
Preferences. -Let c m,t and c h,t denote the period t ∈ {1, 2} consumption of the migrant and villager respectively. In addition, let l m,t and h m,t denote migrant's period t hours of leisure and work respectively, such that l m,t + h m,t =h, whereh represents the total number of hours available to allocate between leisure and work (typically,h = 24) . We assume that migrants and villagers have period t felicity functions denoted by u m (c m,t , l m,t ) and u h (c h,t ) respectively. The functions take a Cobb-Douglas form for the migrant such that u m (c m,t , l m,t ) = (1 − α)ln(c m,t ) + αln(l m,t ), where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 represents the weight placed on leisure. For the villager, we abstract from the labor-leisure choice problem and simply let u h (c h,t ) = ln(c h,t ).
Following Rapoport and Docquier (2005) , migrants are assumed to exhibit altruistic preferences of the weighted average form U m,t = (1−φ)u m (c m,t , l m,t )+φu h (c h,t ) where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 2 represents the weight placed on the paired villager. Villagers do not exhibit altruistic preferences, and derive utility from own consumption U h,t = u h (c h,t ). Rapoport and Docquier (2005) refer to such preferences between the migrant and villager as unilateral altruism. Following Sobel (2005) , this is a case of "intrinsic reciprocity" in which migrants are willing to sacrifice their own consumption to help their family in the village rather than selfishly maximizing their individual utility. 1 This assumption is consistent with the exclusively urban-to-rural direction of remittances observed in our sample.
Timing. -Period 1 represents monga, or the lean season, a time when rural incomes are particularly low and families sometimes skip meals. We assume that villager income during the lean season is y.
Period 2 represents the "normal", non-lean season. 2 Rural incomes are higher during these months due to the increased availability of work. We assume that villager income during the non-lean season isȳ, whereȳ > y > 0. Migrants earn income w·h m,t in period t, where w ≥ 0 is the exogenously set hourly wage. Migrants and villagers discount period 2 utility by discount factor 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Within each period, the migrant makes choices before the villager. Each period, the villager optimizes taking as given the remittances sent by the migrant.
Choices. -Migrants choose the amount of remittances to transfer to the paired villager in each period, T t , in addition to their own consumption, c m,t , and hours of work, h m,t . For simplicity, we assume that migrants do not borrow or save. As a result, we implicitly assume that migrants cannot choose to set h m,t = 0. Migrants incur a cost p > 0 proportional to the size of the remittance. The choice of a proportional cost as opposed to a fixed cost maps directly to our setting, where the mobile banking service bKash charges a transaction fee of 1.85% for withdrawals, but p also reflects broader costs including the opportunity cost of time. Villagers have access to credit and can borrow B ≥ 0 at interest rate r ≥ 0. Villagers also choose their consumption in each period, c h,t .
To summarize, we have the following timeline: 
Theoretical Predictions
Solving the model, we obtain the following theoretical predictions (see Appendix for proofs):
1. Remittances increase with a decrease in p: ∂T 1 ∂p < 0, ∂T 2 ∂p < 0. Remittances can be thought of as spending on consumption of the paired villager, through which the migrant altruistically derives utility. Thus a decrease in the cost of sending remittances p has positive income and substitution effects on remittances in each period. These predictions require that (i) the hourly wage rate for migrants in each period is sufficiently large that flows of remittances only go from migrants to villagers (and never in the opposite direction), and (ii) the interest rate in each period is sufficiently large to make borrowing, and hence the movement of money from the non-lean season to the lean season, prohibitively costly for villagers. 3 (See Appendix for the exact conditions.) 2. Villager consumption increases with a decrease in p:
The extra remittances received (due to the drop in cost p) increases the disposable income of villagers in each period. The positive income effect then raises villager consumption in each period.
3. Villager borrowing decreases with a decrease in p: ∂B ∂p > 0. In general, remittances reduce villagers' need for loans, but this is not necessarily so if villagers already have good access to credit at low interest rates. The main effect is that a decrease in p leads to an increase in period 1 (lean season) remittances. The income effect then reduces borrowing in period 1. But a decrease in p also leads to an increase in period 2 remittances, and, in order to optimize their inter-temporal consumption problem, villagers would like to borrow more (to move some of this future income to period 1). An interest rate that is large enough deters this intertemporal smoothing motive by making borrowing prohibitively expensive (see the Appendix for the exact condition). Under the interest rate assumption, the net income effect dominates and villagers decrease borrowing when p falls.
Migrant consumption decreases with a decrease in p:
∂c m,1 ∂p > 0, ∂c m,2 ∂p > 0. If sending remittances becomes less costly, it would seem that migrants would have surplus with which to increase their own consumption. This income effect arises for two reasons: (i) the reduction in p leads to a direct income effect, and (ii) as seen below, a reduction in p causes the migrant to work more, thereby increasing income further. At the same time, however, a decrease in p leads to a substitution effect away from migrant's own consumption towards villager consumption. Given the set-up and assumption of intrinsic reciprocity, the substitution effect outweighs the income effect here, leading to decreases in migrant consumption with a decrease in p.
Migrant hours of work increase with a decrease in p:
∂h m,1 ∂p < 0, ∂h m,2 ∂p < 0. A decrease in p leads to a substitution effect, shifting the migrant's own leisure towards villager consumption. This substitution away from leisure leads to an increase in the migrants' hours worked. Effectively, one can think of p as a tax on part of the migrant's spending. A reduction in the tax leads to a positive labor supply effect.
6. Fraction of migrant income remitted increases with a decrease in p:
3. We do not impose a borrowing constraint in the model, but the restriction that the interest rate be sufficiently large acts as an equivalent credit market imperfection. Large interest rates and borrowing constraints limit the ability of villagers to optimize their inter-temporal consumption problem, leading migrants, who care about villager consumption via altruism, to respond through remittances.
∂p < 0. Both remittances and hours worked by migrants increase in each period with a decrease in p (predictions 1 and 5, respectively). Thus, the impact of a cost reduction on the fraction of migrant income remitted is not immediately clear. Under the assumptions of the model, however, the positive income and substitution effects on remittances outweigh the substitution effect away from leisure, thereby leading to an increase in the fraction of migrant income remitted in each period with a decrease in p.
In sum, the model predicts that an improved remittance technology will lead to increases in remittances and, in turn, rural consumption. For migrants, however, consumption can fall and labor increase as the technnology increases the efficiency of sacrificing to support one's relatives.
Appendix B. Analysis of Spillovers
In principle there may be spillovers which would lead to a SUTVA violation. Such spillovers could potentially arise through either a network of risk-sharing or general equilibrium effects. In the presence of such spillovers, we may expect to see a relationship between treatment density and outcomes, as spillovers would be stronger when treatment density would be higher. We analyzed whether adoption of bKash in the control group was influenced by the share of households treated in villages in our study. Because the randomization was not stratified on village, we have naturally occurring experimental variation in the share of households in our study which were treated per village. We find no effects of treatment density on the decision of control households to adopt bKash, or on other outcomes, including consumption. However, we should note that because we have limited variation in treatment density, and because there are only 281 villages, the power for this test is limited. Note that in Meghir et al (2019) the village is identified as the appropriate unit for risk sharing. 4 In this section, we present results by presenting results separately for the SHIREE and snowball sub-samples. We start by showing that within these sub-samples, we have treatment-control balance. We then present our main results for the SHIREE sub-sample, followed by the results for the snowball sub-sample.
Treatment-Control Balance Within Sub-Samples
We have overall treatment-control balance within the separate SHIREE and snowball sub-samples. The p-values are 0.995 and 0.705 for F-tests of joint orthogonality within the SHIREE and snowball sub-samples, respectively. Of 48 variables tested for treatment-control differences, only 3 variables were statistically significant at the 10% level, while none were statistically significant at the 5% level. By definition, we would expect, on average, 5 out of 48 variables to show differences at the 10% level of significance, so it is not surprising that we see differences for 3 variables. These variables are: (i) decimal of owned agricultural land for the SHIREE subsample (p-value = 0.094), (ii) formal employment among migrants for the snowball sub-sample (p-value = 0.083), and (iii) rural poverty rates using the national threshold for the snowball sub-sample (p-value = 0.061). In Appendix sections Appendix C.3 and Appendix C.4, we run specifications on the SHIREE and snowball samples separately, and we find similar results on outcomes in both sub-samples. 
Summary Statistics for SHIREE and Snowball Sub-Samples
The results in the main text combine evidence from two sub-samples. The two rural samples have identical rates levels of poverty (both 75%) and comparable baseline levels of consumption (63.1 taka daily per capita expenditure for SHIREE households and 61.6 for the snowball sample). The two urban subsamples also have comparable daily per capita expenditure (118.4 taka for SHIREE and 122.1 for the snowball sample), but migrants in the snowball sample differ on other dimensions. In particular, they were more likely to be in formal employment and male, and they earned more and sent more remittances at baseline. Overall, the SHIREE and snowball sub-samples differ significantly in statistical terms (p-value for F-test for joint orthogonality is 0.000). Overall, though, these are differences within a larger context of similarity. Both are very poor and are drawn from the same district in Bangladesh.
In Appendix sections Appendix C.3 and Appendix C.4 we estimate treatment effects separately for each subsample and find that the results are largely similar (with a few important differences discussed in Section 5), and the patterns from the combined sample are not consistently driven by one or the other of the samples. While we have estimated treatment effects within the SHIREE and snowball subsamples to explore heterogeneity and robustness, we note that the experimental design was not powered for these analyses. (1) and (2) is total remittances (sent through any means) sent in the prior 7 months as self-reported by urban migrants. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is remittances sent through bKash. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is total remittances as a share of migrant income. (5) is restricted to households with at least one school-age child. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables and the baseline dependent variable. (1) is an indicator of poverty status judged by the 2016 urban poverty line in Bangladesh. Column (2) is a binary indicator for working in a garment factory. Column (3) is a binary indicator for holding any financial saving. Column (4) dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of savings. Column (5) is an index based on a set of variables transformed as z-scores, standardized relative to their baseline distributions. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables and the baseline dependent variable.
Results for SHIREE Sub-Sample Only
VOL. (1) -(4) is the average number of hours worked per day in the prior 12 months as self-reported by urban migrants, conditional on working in the given month. Variables such as "Garments Worker", "Female Migrant", "Female Garments Worker", "Treatment * Garments Worker", "Treatment * Female Migrant", and "Treatment * Female Garments Worker" are absorbed by the migrant fixed effects. (1) - (4) is the average number of hours worked per day in the prior 12 months as self-reported by urban migrants, conditional on working in the given month. Variables such as "Garments Worker", "Female Migrant", "Female Garments Worker", "Active Account * Garments Worker", "Active Account * Female Migrant", and "Active Account * Female Garments Worker" are absorbed by the migrant fixed effects.
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NO. ONLINE APPENDIX 17 (1) and (2) is total remittances (sent through any means) sent in the prior 7 months as self-reported by urban migrants. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is remittances sent through bKash. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is total remittances as a share of migrant income. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables. All regressions with the exception of "No Monga Problem" are estimated with the baseline dependent variable, as this variable was not captured at baseline. Column (2) dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of total loan value. Column (4) dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of total savings value. Column (5) dependent variable is the number of meals per day during the monga season. Column (6) dependent variable is the monthly calorie sufficiency (difference between calorie consumption and calorie needs) for all household members, in thousands of calories. Column (7) dependent variable is an indicator for households reporting no difficulty during the lean (monga) season in response to a survey question about ways of coping during monga. (5) is restricted to households with at least one school-age child. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables and the baseline dependent variable.
Results for Snowball Sub-Sample Only
VOL. (1) is an indicator of poverty status judged by the 2016 urban poverty line in Bangladesh. Column (2) is a binary indicator for working in a garment factory. Column (3) is a binary indicator for holding any financial saving. Column (4) dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of savings. Column (5) is an index based on a set of variables transformed as z-scores, standardized relative to their baseline distributions. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables and the baseline dependent variable. 193 10,193 10,193 10,193 193 10,193 10,193 10,193 In this section, we assess robustness of our results to the definition of active account used. In the paper, we define active use to be an indicator variable equal to 1 if at least 1 transaction was made within the past 13 months. We consider alternative definitions of active account in which at least 1 transaction was made within the past 6 months, 3 months, or 1 month. The impact of these alternative definitions on the first stage is presented in Table 21 .
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Two things are of note here. First, all estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level, highlighting that treatment-control differences in active use remain regardless of the definition of active account. Second, the decrease in estimated coefficients should not be interpreted as a fade-out of the impact of the intervention. This is because we see a comparable decrease in active use among the control group as well. For example, for rural households, active account use within the control group fell from 22% for the past 13 months to 13% for the past 1 montha 41% reduction. Meanwhile, active account use within treatment group fell from 70% to 33% -a similarly large 53% reduction. We think that the decrease could be attributed to other factors, including seasonality, rather than a fade-out of the impact of the treatment.
As an additional robustness check, we re-run all our main results using active account use within the past one month. While our LATE estimates scale by approximately 1/0.2 = 5, the statistical significance of LATE results remain unchanged. We choose to present the most conservative LATE estimates in the paper and hence use the definition of active use within the past 13 months. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions estimated with baseline control variables. "Active account use" in columns (1) -(4) takes the value 1 if the household performed any type of bKash transaction over the past 13, 6, 3, and 1 month periods respectively (including deposits, withdrawals, remittances, and airtime top-ups), constructed using administrative data from bKash. (1) and (2) is total remittances (sent through any means) sent in the prior 7 months as self-reported by urban migrants. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is remittances sent through bKash. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is total remittances as a share of migrant income. (1) is an indicator of poverty status. Column (2) is the squared poverty gap calculated for each household. Columns (3), (4), and (5) are indices based on a set of variables transformed as z-scores, standardized relative to their baseline distributions. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables and the baseline dependent variable. 813  813  813  813  813  813  813 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables. All regressions with the exception of "No Monga Problem" are estimated with the baseline dependent variable, as this variable was not captured at baseline. Column (2) dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of total loan value. Column (4) dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of total savings value. Column (5) dependent variable is the number of meals per day during the monga season. Column (6) dependent variable is the monthly calorie sufficiency (difference between calorie consumption and calorie needs) for all household members, in thousands of calories. Column (7) dependent variable is an indicator for households reporting no difficulty during the lean (monga) season in response to a survey question about ways of coping during monga. (5) is restricted to households with at least one school-age child. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables and the baseline dependent variable.
VOL. (1) is an indicator of poverty status judged by the 2016 urban poverty line in Bangladesh. Column (2) is a binary indicator for working in a garment factory. Column (3) is a binary indicator for holding any financial saving. Column (4) dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of savings. Column (5) is an index based on a set of variables transformed as z-scores, standardized relative to their baseline distributions. All regressions are estimated with baseline control variables and the baseline dependent variable. (4) is the average number of hours worked per day in the prior 12 months as self-reported by urban migrants, conditional on working in the given month. Variables such as "Garments Worker", "Female Migrant", "Female Garments Worker", "Active Account * Garments Worker", "Active Account * Female Migrant", and "Active Account * Female Garments Worker" are absorbed by the migrant fixed effects. 
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Appendix G. Proofs for Theoretical Results
Solve for Consumption, Borrowing, Hours of Work, and Remittances
The model is solved by starting at the last stage of the problem and working backwards. In period 2, the villager exhausts its budget constraint, hence: subject to budget constraint: c m,2 ≤ wh m,2 − T 2 (1 + p)
Using (1) and Lagrange multiplier λ, the Lagrangian for this problem is as follows:
Assuming interior solutions, we obtain the following first order conditions:
= 0 : c m,2 − wh m,2 + T 2 (1 + p) = 0 (5) Solving this system of equations, we obtain:
Plugging (6) into (1), we also obtain: subject to budget constraint: c h,1 ≤ y + T 1 + B
Using (9) and Lagrange multiplier µ, the Lagrangian for this problem is as follows:
Solving this system of equations, we obtain:
Plugging (13) into (6), (7), (8), and (9) we also obtain: VOL.
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subject to budget constraint: c m,1 ≤ wh m,1 − T 1 (1 + p)
Using (14), (16), (17), (18), and Lagrange multiplier ψ, the Lagrangian for this problem is as follows:
We can also use (23) to solve for the following: Ensuring Remittances are Non-Negative: For T 1 ≥ 0, we require:
For T 2 ≥ 0, we require: . Then T 1 is non-negative if and only if w ≥ w 1 and T 2 is non-negative if and only if w ≥ w 2 . These conditions are needed to prevent flows of remittances from villagers to migrants when migrant income is too low.
Derive Comparative Statics for Changes in the Price of Remittances
Remittances:
Therefore ∂T 1 ∂p < 0 if and only if:
Let r 1 = 1−φ β+φ −1. Then a decrease in p leads to an increase in period 1 remittances received by villagers if and only if r > r 1 .
∂T 2 ∂p = − wh (1 + p) 2 (1 + β) 2 1 + β 2 − β(1 + r) + φ(2 + r) β − (1 − φ) Therefore ∂T 2 ∂p < 0 if and only if:
. Then a decrease in p leads to an increase in period 2 remittances received by villagers if and only if r > r 2 .
Fraction of Income Remitted:
Let the fraction of income remitted in period 1 be γ 1 = T 1 wh m,1 . Then we have:
(1 + r)y +ȳ wh 1 + β + r(1 + β − α(1 − φ)) − 2α(1 − φ) − α(1 + p)(1 − φ) (1 + r)y +ȳ VOL.
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Let:
θ 0 = (1 − φ) (1 + r)y +ȳ ,
Then we have:
Therefore ∂γ 1 ∂p < 0 if and only if:
Since θ 0 < θ 1 by condition (32), the above set of inequalities is satisfied. Therefore a decrease in p will lead to an increase in the fraction of income remitted in period 1.
Let the fraction of income remitted in period 2 be γ 2 = T 2 wh m,2 . Then we have: γ 2 = wh 1+p 1 + β 2 − β(1 + r) + φ(2 + r) β − (1 − φ) − β(1 − φ)(β + φ) (1 + r)y +ȳ wh 1 + β 2 + β − α(2 + r)(1 − φ)(β + φ) − αβ(1 − φ)(β + φ)(1 + p) (1 + r)y +ȳ Let:
, and η 2 = wh 1 + β 2 + β − α(2 + r)(1 − φ)(β + φ) .
∂γ 2 ∂p = (η 2 − α(1 + p)η 0 )(− η 1 1+p ) − (η 1 − η 0 )(−αη 0 ) (η 2 − α(1 + p)η 0 ) 2 Therefore ∂γ 2 ∂p < 0 if and only if:
Since η 0 < η 1 by condition (33), the above set of inequalities is satisfied. Therefore a decrease in p will lead to an increase in the fraction of income remitted in period 2.
Consumption:
∂c h,1 ∂p = − wh(2 + r)(β + φ) (1 + r)(1 + p) 2 (1 + β) 2 < 0 ∂c h,2 ∂p = − βφwh(2 + r)(β + φ) (1 + p) 2 (1 + β) 2 < 0 Therefore a decrease in p leads to increases in c h,1 and c h,2 and decreases in c m,1 and c m,2 .
Villager Borrowing:
∂B ∂p
= − wh 1 − β β(1 + r) + φ(2 + r) − 2 (1 + r)(1 + p) 2 (1 + β) 2
Therefore ∂B ∂p > 0 if and only if:
. Then a decrease in p leads to a decrease in borrowing by villagers if and only if r > r B . VOL.
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Migrant Hours of Work:
Therefore a decrease in p leads to increases in h m,1 and h m,2 .
